October was the deadliest month for United States forces in Afghanistan since the conflict began in 2001. Over 50% of Americans support a general withdrawal. Amidst financial panic at home, Americans are, more than ever, questioning the war’s long-term goals. This week, President Obama is expected to heed General McChrystal’s (distressingly public) request and send at least 30,000 additional American troops into the war zone.
Perhaps it is fitting that CNN.com ran a piece today on Michael White, a suburban Atlantan who created the now infamous icasualties.org website. White has kept count of all American, coalition, and civilian deaths since the Iraq War began in 2003 (he later began counting the Afghan War dead as well). The piece asserts that “[casualty statistics] are critical to shaping the legacy of wars.” This led me to question the precise correlation between death tolls (raw data, numbers) and civilian perceptions of war.
One of the most palpable factoids surrounding the American Civil War is that it “accounted for more American deaths [620,000+] than all U.S. wars from the Revolution through Vietnam.” Every school child has been exposed to this declaration in some form, and it continues to shape popular opinions of the war. Similarly, many Americans are aware of that iniquitous number – 416,000 – that represents American deaths between 1941 and 1945. Yet the American wars that cost the most (the Civil War and WWII) are viewed as the most worthy. They did eradicate slavery and fascism, or so the story goes. But is there a political element to rationalizing casualties by emphasizing that they solve social issues? Is this essential to a pro-war ideology? What is the common denominator here?
First off, we must bring to light the conspicuous: numbers never tell the entire story. Although a recent thread on h-civwar.org doubted the usefulness of lumping Union and Confederate casualties together (an argument I find abhorrent), the customary figure of Civil War deaths is roughly 620,000 (even if many historians have compellingly argued that it is much higher). That numeral, 620,000, represented 600 deaths per day and 2% of the total American population. Likewise, approximately 416,000 Americans were killed in World War Two at a rate of just over 400 per day. But that number accounted for less than 2% of all casualties between 1939 and 1945 and just .32% of the U.S. population. In the midst of a global, industrial, and, in many places, total conflict, it was but a blip on the human toll radar. American economic might, of course, was far more decisive than American bodies. The point remains, however, that casualties are always relative. Moreover, Americans in the past have tolerated extreme and punctuated killing so long as public opinion holds firm and the ensuing carnage achieves its “political aims,” fabricated or manipulated though they may be.
So, societies, even democracies, tolerate losses in wars that they, for whatever reason, deem worthy. But what of the wars that are viewed as the least worthy? Like Iraq, Afghanistan has been compared to the Vietnam conflict ad nauseum. While I understand that Vietnam is still within the realm of the “remembered past” for many Americans (and thus explains much of its “felt legacy”), its statistical cost was comparatively low. In terms of deaths per day (one way to measure concentrated killing) World War One was fully 10 times deadlier than Vietnam. Korea, another “forgotten war,” was almost twice as deadly. Yet World War One (which has been popularly perceived as “someone else’s victory,” unlike WW II) and Korea (fought to attain a political goal that is no loner deemed urgent) are remembered most today for having been forgotten in American culture, despite their apparent bloodiness and moderate political successes. This then begs the question, “Is there any correlation between casualty lists and popular perceptions and felt history?” Vietnam was “low cost” in terms of American combat losses, or so the data assures me, but it still resonates within American society in tragic, tangible ways. Part of the explanation, I suppose, is not simply its failure to accomplish political ends or the fact that there was no way to sell it as a “victory,” but also the fear that we haven’t fully learned from it.
Clearly, the legacy of Vietnam was shaped less by raw data than by its strategic-political deficiencies and the exhaustion it enacted on American society. While I’m not going to fully engage the current historical debate as to whether Vietnam was ever “winnable,” I do agree that “victory” was unlikely by the time General Abrams replaced General Westmoreland in 1968, despite Abrams’ ostensibly capable counterinsurgency strategy. American public opinion – the most important component – had already turned. Similarly, despite the potential efficacy of McChrystal’s strategy, I suspect that the forthcoming surge will prove but a temporary bailout and that the legacy of Afghanistan – a war without popular support or clear political aims – has already been wrought.
Perhaps it is fitting that CNN.com ran a piece today on Michael White, a suburban Atlantan who created the now infamous icasualties.org website. White has kept count of all American, coalition, and civilian deaths since the Iraq War began in 2003 (he later began counting the Afghan War dead as well). The piece asserts that “[casualty statistics] are critical to shaping the legacy of wars.” This led me to question the precise correlation between death tolls (raw data, numbers) and civilian perceptions of war.
One of the most palpable factoids surrounding the American Civil War is that it “accounted for more American deaths [620,000+] than all U.S. wars from the Revolution through Vietnam.” Every school child has been exposed to this declaration in some form, and it continues to shape popular opinions of the war. Similarly, many Americans are aware of that iniquitous number – 416,000 – that represents American deaths between 1941 and 1945. Yet the American wars that cost the most (the Civil War and WWII) are viewed as the most worthy. They did eradicate slavery and fascism, or so the story goes. But is there a political element to rationalizing casualties by emphasizing that they solve social issues? Is this essential to a pro-war ideology? What is the common denominator here?
First off, we must bring to light the conspicuous: numbers never tell the entire story. Although a recent thread on h-civwar.org doubted the usefulness of lumping Union and Confederate casualties together (an argument I find abhorrent), the customary figure of Civil War deaths is roughly 620,000 (even if many historians have compellingly argued that it is much higher). That numeral, 620,000, represented 600 deaths per day and 2% of the total American population. Likewise, approximately 416,000 Americans were killed in World War Two at a rate of just over 400 per day. But that number accounted for less than 2% of all casualties between 1939 and 1945 and just .32% of the U.S. population. In the midst of a global, industrial, and, in many places, total conflict, it was but a blip on the human toll radar. American economic might, of course, was far more decisive than American bodies. The point remains, however, that casualties are always relative. Moreover, Americans in the past have tolerated extreme and punctuated killing so long as public opinion holds firm and the ensuing carnage achieves its “political aims,” fabricated or manipulated though they may be.
So, societies, even democracies, tolerate losses in wars that they, for whatever reason, deem worthy. But what of the wars that are viewed as the least worthy? Like Iraq, Afghanistan has been compared to the Vietnam conflict ad nauseum. While I understand that Vietnam is still within the realm of the “remembered past” for many Americans (and thus explains much of its “felt legacy”), its statistical cost was comparatively low. In terms of deaths per day (one way to measure concentrated killing) World War One was fully 10 times deadlier than Vietnam. Korea, another “forgotten war,” was almost twice as deadly. Yet World War One (which has been popularly perceived as “someone else’s victory,” unlike WW II) and Korea (fought to attain a political goal that is no loner deemed urgent) are remembered most today for having been forgotten in American culture, despite their apparent bloodiness and moderate political successes. This then begs the question, “Is there any correlation between casualty lists and popular perceptions and felt history?” Vietnam was “low cost” in terms of American combat losses, or so the data assures me, but it still resonates within American society in tragic, tangible ways. Part of the explanation, I suppose, is not simply its failure to accomplish political ends or the fact that there was no way to sell it as a “victory,” but also the fear that we haven’t fully learned from it.
Clearly, the legacy of Vietnam was shaped less by raw data than by its strategic-political deficiencies and the exhaustion it enacted on American society. While I’m not going to fully engage the current historical debate as to whether Vietnam was ever “winnable,” I do agree that “victory” was unlikely by the time General Abrams replaced General Westmoreland in 1968, despite Abrams’ ostensibly capable counterinsurgency strategy. American public opinion – the most important component – had already turned. Similarly, despite the potential efficacy of McChrystal’s strategy, I suspect that the forthcoming surge will prove but a temporary bailout and that the legacy of Afghanistan – a war without popular support or clear political aims – has already been wrought.